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UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS
OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT - A MISTY
MOOR OF LEGALISMS OR THE RAMPART
OF PROTECTIONISM?
JOHN

T.

STEWART, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

T

HE WORLD OF aviation has and continues to exist in
an ever increasing environment of multinationalism.
Carriers, once clearly identified with citizens of their flag,
are becoming objects of multinational ownership.' Aircraft are manufactured by multinational consortiums 2 and
* Partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger.
Formerly Asst. Chief Counsel, International Affairs and Legal Policy, United
States Federal Aviation Administration. Served as Chairman, Transportation Law
Section of the United States Federal Bar Association and Chairman, Air and Space
Transportation Law Committee, United States Federal Bar Association; A.B. Yale
University (1949), LLB. Columbia University (1955).
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Kenneth S. Nankin and Patrice
M. Kelly, associates, Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger, and John C. Kalitka, a summer assistant from T.C. Williams School of Law, for their assistance in researching the legislative history and providing editorial comment.
The proposed purchase by British Airways and KLM of 20% of the shares in
Sabena is one current example. See Intelligence, 296 Aviation Daily 307 (May 15,
1989). In the United States, foreign airlines gained minority interests in a number
of United States-owned air carriers: Ansett Airlines of Australia has a 20% interest in America West Airlines; a subsidiary ofJapan Air Lines owns 20% of Hawaiian Airlines; Scandinavian Airlines System controls nine percent of Continental
Airlines; and Swissair recently acquired five percent of Delta Air Lines. For insight into the difficulties on the horizon in international aviation negotiations because of multinational ownership, see Rules for the Airway, J. Com., June 26, 1989,
at 12A, col. 1.
'1For example, Airbus Industrie is composed of partners from France, West
Germany, Britain, Spain, the'Netherlands, and Belgium. See Boyd, The Commercial
Aircraft Market in North America, TRANSLAW, Winter 1988, at 1 (publication of Fed.
Bar Ass'n). France tops all other countries in terms of economic interests in the
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owned in part, or leased, by persons other than the citizens of the flag which the aircraft bears.' Governments
may find themselves dealing with each other not in their
individual capacity, but in multinational arenas of common economic interest. Europe 1992 is almost upon us.
The International Civil Aviation Organization is calling
for government consultation, rather than confrontation,
in addressing competition disputes.4 Foreign interests
continue to seek to invest in the United States,5 and
Airbus A340. French interests comprise a full 30%, while the United States maintains a 27% share. Other significant interests are represented by West Germany
at 19%, and the United Kingdom with 14%. The United States share increases if
the aircraft's CFM international engines are included. With the Airbus A330,
United States interests are about 50%, including the engines. See Intelligence, 297
Aviation Daily 131 (July 24, 1989).
Another example of multinational manufacturing is Dornier's 328 regional aircraft made in Munich, Germany. Honeywell agreed to supply the advanced avionics, Aermacchi of Italy will supply fuselages, and landing gear will be provided by
ERAM of France. Still other examples include: the agreement by Transnational
Industries of Greenwich, Conn. to supply engine pylon fittings for Bombardiers'
Airbus aircraft; British Aerospace's selection of Simmond Precision, a subsidiary
of Hercules of Wilmington, Del., and SFENA of France to produce fuel control
and monitoring systems for the Airbus A330 and A340; and the agreement by
CAE Electronics, Montreal, to design and manufacture flight simulators for Kuwait Airways' Airbus A310, A300 and Boeing's 767-300ER. See Aviation Suppliers,
296 Aviation Daily 214 (May 1, 1989).
Stewart, Aircraft Leasing Practicesin the United States - A Few Observations, 8 AIR
L. 58, 76-78 (1983); see also Stewart, Lease, Charterand Interchange of Aircraft: A Governmental Perspective, 14 AKRON L. REV. 187, 199-203 (1980).
I International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Circular, No. 215-AT/85,
Guidance Material on the Avoidance or Resolution of Conflicts over the Application of Competition Laws to International Air Transport 1-6 (1989).
, The Department of the Treasury recently announced regulations regarding
international investments which subject to federal scrutiny certain transactions involving the transfer of control over materials, equipment, personnel and research.
See Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign
Persons, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,744 (1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800) (proposed July 5, 1989). For a general discussion of the regulations, see Driving Investment Away, J. Com., July 26, 1989, at 8A, col. 1.
Also, Congress is presently considering H.R. 3699, the "Reciprocity of Foreign
Investment Act" which would authorize reciprocal response to foreign actions
and policies which restrict United States investment in a foreign nation. H.R.
3699, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. E3927-28 (1989). The Bill hopes to
open investment opportunities to the United States in exchange for concessions
the United States has made or will make to foreign investors. While foreign control is feared, it is believed that reciprocity in investment policies will mitigate the
"price tag" of control which comes with foreign ownership. Id. at E3928.
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GATT (the General Agreement on Trade Tariffs) is beginning to look at international aviation in the context of
its review of the service sector.6 In this atmosphere, the
citizenship requirement of United States law 7 relating to
aviation activities emerges in the eyes of some as an obstacle to the inevitability of true multinationalism, and to
others as the bastion of protection of United States interests. To be sure, the citizenship requirement is one of the
lynchpins of United States aviation law.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 sets forth the requirements that United States air carriers be citizens of the
United States and that eligibility for registering aircraft in
the United States extend only to United States citizens. 8
The Act specifically defines a "citizen of the United
States." 9 However, when examining the definition of a
United States citizen and the various interpretations that
have been applied to it by United States government
agencies, one is caught up in traversing a misty moor of
legal uncertainty. For example, the statutory definition of
citizenship refers to partnerships.' ° One government
agency interprets this language as permitting only partnerships composed solely of individuals," while another
agency interprets the exact same language as authorizing
partnerships which include corporations.12 The corporate
,1For a general discussion on current negotiations involving international trade
and services, see GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/7(MIN) at 40-43 (1988).
7 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(a), (b) (1982) (citizenship required to register an
aircraft); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1982) (citizenship defined); 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1301(3) (1982) (air carrier defined).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(b) (1982).

See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1982).
Id. § 1301(16)(b).
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) interprets 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1301(16) as including only partnerships whose members are individuals, as opposed to partnerships whose members are corporations. Letter from Joseph T.
Brennan, FAA Aeronautical Center Counsel, to Clinton Smith of Tufo, Johnston,
Zuccotti and Allegaret (Dec. 10, 1979) [hereinafter FAA Letter] (discussing partnerships for citizenship purposes).
12 The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), predecessor agency to the Department
of Transportation (DOT) on economic issues, has allowed partnerships to include
corporations. See Chicago Airlink Partnership & Chicago Airlink, Inc., CAB Order
No. 84-10-69, at 5 (Oct. 16, 1984).

688

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[55

stock ownership requirements contained in the citizenship
definition are interpreted one way for aircraft registration
3
purposes, and in another vein for air carrier ownership.'
The purpose of this Article is to further explore the diversities in the citizenship definition, to examine the origins of the citizenship requirement in United States
aviation law, and finally, to suggest with some timidity
possible paths through the mist. Any such exploration
necessarily brings into play an awareness of competing
United States domestic and foreign policy concerns those which encourage an open investment market and
continued United States leadership in aircraft manufacturing and sale, and those which continue to demand economic protection for the United States aviation industry.
I.

ORIGINS OF THE CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT

In order to understand the United States government's
position with respect to citizenship requirements and to
suggest certain options for change, it is important to be
aware of how United States policy emerged. While
United States air transportation existed in embryonic
form prior to World War I,14 the wartime use of aircraft
engendered a recognition of the potential for its use commercially. 15 In the context of the United States "citizen[W]e are aware that the FAA ... interprets the term "such an individual" in § 101(16)(b) to require that each partner be a natural person .... We do not read the statute so narrowly, and consider the
term "individual," which is not defined in the Act, to be synonymous
with "person" which § 101(32) defines as including corporations.

Id.

'.See In re Intera Arctic Servs., Inc., DOT Order No. 87-3-32, at 2 n. I (Mar. 9,
1987).

"-

See N.

KOMMONS, BONFIRES TO BEACONS: FEDERAL CIVIL. AVIATION POLICY

UNDER THE AIR COMMERCE ACT 1926-1938, at 11 (1978) (FAA publication).
See Inquiry into Operationsof the United States Air Services: Hearing Before the House
Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air Services, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1228 (1924) (statement of Howard E. Coffin, member, Council on National Defense).
Already lines of aerial transportation are being used in England and
France in a small way for commercial purposes .... A daily service
from London to Paris has been in operation for some time, and
promises to be quite serviceable as soon as it can be relieved of its
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ship" requirement, commercial aviation development
embodied two basic policies. One policy encouraged and
protected a fledgling domestic industry in commercial air
transportation, while the other sought to assure that sufficient aircraft would be available for United States national
security purposes.' 6 For a considerable period of time
both considerations travelled the same "citizenship"
track. The examination of this track begins with a review
of the Air
of the legislative history attending the passage
7
Act").'
"1926
(the
1926
of
Act
Commerce
The statutory citizenship requirement first appeared in
the 1926 Act, which was Congress' first national policy enwar-time military supervision. Other lines now in operation are
from Paris to Lille and Brussels and from Paris to various points in
Alsace-Lorraine and German-occupied territory. Among other
plans, English private interests are projecting airplane lines from
Cairo to the Cape and Cairo to Bombay, and French interests are
planning to run a line to Algeria and Morocco. These lines will carry
mail, passengers, and express, and it is expected that they will materially shorten the time between European centers and their far-distant terminals. The United States Post Office Department has
carried mail by airplane from New York to Washington for over a
year with a record of nearly 100 per cent delivery at each end every
day. It is now inaugurating a line from New York to Chicago which
will shorten the mail time between these two points to about onehalf. It is also projecting a two-day service from New York to San
Francisco. England is already desirous of organizing with the United
States a trans-Atlantic airship line for mail service which would give
a five-day mail service from London to San Francisco. Such a service
is entirely possible at this time, and its inauguration depends only
upon adequate encouragement and financial support.
Id.
Id. at 527 (statement of Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, Chief of the Army Air
Service).
[T]he committee undoubtedly understands ... the intimate relation
between commercial aviation and the military Air Service. We will
never have a military Air Service sufficient to meet a major war emergency. We will have to depend upon civilian agencies to supplement
our needs in such an emergency. We must have a reservoir of pilots
and material from which to draw, and unless there is commercial
aviation we will not have that civilian body to draft into the military
[M]ilitary men who have studied the matservice in time of war ....
we should do all we can to encourage
that
convinced
ter are firmly
commercial air traffic.
Id.
(for17 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, §§ 1-14, 44 Stat. 568
merly 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 171-184 (West 1951) (repealed 1958).
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actment with respect to aviation. The 1926 Act defined a
citizen of the United States as an individual who is a
United States citizen, a partnership consisting of individuals who are United States citizens, or a corporation which
meets two criteria.' 8 For a corporation to be a citizen, the
president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors
or other managing officers of the corporation must be individuals who are United States citizens, and United
States citizens must control at least fifty-one per centum
of the voting interest of the corporation.' 9 The 1926 Act
also contained the first provision governing the eligibility
of aircraft for registration in the United States, requiring
that civil aircraft be "owned by a citizen of the United
States and not registered under the laws of any foreign
country" in order to be eligible for registration.20
In revisiting the 1926 Act and its origins, it is important
to bear in mind that the 1926 Act emerged in the era following World War I and, among other things, was conceived with the view of regulating the use of aircraft and
the business of air transportation. For instance, the 1926
Act made it unlawful to navigate any aircraft in interstate
or foreign air commerce 2' unless such aircraft was regisi ld. § 9(a), 44 Stat. at 573.
The term "citizen of the United States" means (1) an individual who
is a citizen of the United States or its possessions, or (2) a partnership of which each member is an individual who is a citizen of the
United States or its possessions, or (3) a corporation or association
created or organized in the United States or under the law of the
United States or of any State, Territory, or possession thereof, of
which the president and two-thirds or more of the board of directors
or other managing officers thereof, as the case may be, are individuals who are citizens of the United States or its possessions and in
which at least 51 per centum of the voting interest is controlled by
persons who are citizens of the United States or its possessions.
19Id.
21" Id. § 3(a), 44 Stat. at 569.
No aircraft shall be eligible for registration (1) unless it is a civil aircraft owned by a citizen of the United States and not registered
under the laws of any foreign country, or (2) unless it is a public
aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State, Territory, or possession, or of a political subdivision thereof.
2,
"Air Commerce" was defined as "transportation in whole or in part by aircraft of persons or property for hire, navigation of aircraft in furtherance of a
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tered in the United States,22 or to navigate any foreign aircraft in the United States except as provided in the 1926
Act. 23 Thus, the regulation of the economics of air transportation was cast in terms of the registration of aircraft.
The legislative concept of restricting the commercial
use of aircraft in the United States to United States citizens first surfaced in a Senate bill introduced in 1922.24
The pertinent section of that bill contemplated a "citizenship" requirement for aircraft used in commerce. The
1922 bill's requirements that the president and all members of the board of directors or managing officers of a
corporation be United States citizens, and that seventyfive percent of the interest in the corporation be owned by
United States citizens were particularly restrictive.25 In
1923, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives as a substitute for the 1922 Senate bill. 26 The 1923
bill introduced the concept of registration of aircraft.
Only civil aircraft owned by a citizen of the United States
and not registered under the laws of a foreign country
could be registered.27
business, or navigation of aircraft from one place to another for operation in the
conduct of a business." Id. § 1, 44 Stat. at 568.
Id. § 11(2), 44 Stat. at 574.
I22
2.
Id. § 6(b), 44 Stat. at 572.
- S. 3076, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922).
2'5 Id. § 6. The bill provided:
That no civil aircraft shall be used in commerce unless owned by a
person who is a citizen of the United States or its dependencies, and
in the case of a partnership unless each member is such citizen: Provided, That in the case of a corporation or association no such aircraft shall be owned by such corporation of [sic] association unless
the president and the board of directors or the managing officers
thereof, as the case may be, are citizens of the United States and the
corporation or association itself is organized under the laws of
United States, or of a State, Territory, District, or possession
thereof, and 75 per centum of the interest therein is owned by citizens of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
'-1;H.R. 13715, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923).
27

Id. § 222(a).

The Secretary [of Commerce] shall by regulation provide for the registration of aircraft as civil aircraft of the United States; but no aircraft shall be so registered unless (1) it is not registered under the
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The definition of "citizen of the United States" which
appeared in the 1923 bill contained less stringent corporate ownership requirements than the 1922 bill. The
1923 version required the president and "three-fourths or
more of the board of directors or managing officers" of
the United States corporation to be United States citizens.
The bill did, however, retain the seventy-five percent corporate ownership requirement.28
Hearings held in 1924 on a version of the 1923 House
bill containing the same definitional framework of United
States citizen, philosophically addressed the corporate
ownership issue. The hearings produced an interesting
colloquy between Congressmen Hoch and Huddleston,
and an assistant to the State Department's Solicitor, Mr.
Hackworth:
MR. HOCH. Let me see if I understand your position.
You are not arguing that we should not make a distinction
between domestic corporations, but you are simply arguing that you would rather not have it done in the definition
here; that if we are to limit any privileges that may come to
corporations we should do it in the various sections dealing with the privileges.
MR. HACKWORTH. Yes; absolutely. The point which I
make goes merely to the form. The department has no
desire to question the purposes of the committee in making a distinction between a corporation of one category
and a corporation of another category. It merely makes
the point that ordinarily corporations organized in the
United States are to be regarded, for most purposes at
least, as citizens, and that to say that a corporation organized in a given way shall be considered a citizen, by implication, means that other corporations are not to be so
regarded. It is just a slight innovation upon the generally
accepted principle that all corporations created in a State
are citizens of the State, which it was thought proper to
bring to your attention.
laws of any foreign country, and (2) it is a civil aircraft owned by a
citizen of the United States.
Id.
_'-'
Id. § 3.
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MR. HUDDLESTON. Is there any reason why that practice should not be continued in this bill? Is there any
more reason why we should apply a different rule to the
matter of aircraft than we would to a railroad corporation
or a steamship line?
MR. HACKWORTH. As regards citizenship?
MR. HUDDLESTON. Yes.
MR. HACKWORTH. Well, I am not so well versed on the
question of aircraft navigation.
MR. HUDDLESTON. In other words, we require here
that three-fourths of the stock of the corporation, we will
say, must be owned by American citizens. Is there any reason for that requirement that you know of?
MR. HACKWORTH. I understand that the proponents of
the bill have a reason, which is, of course, to keep these
corporations primarily American; that is, to have the controlling interest in American citizens for reasons of domestic policy. That is my understanding.
MR. HUDDLESTON. That is just what I am trying to get
at. What are those reasons, if they are known to you?
MR. HACKWORTH. I am afraid I shall not be able to
answer that question. 9
As can be recognized from this exchange, Congress intended to condition the right of corporations to engage in
aviation activity, namely aircraft ownership and use, by
imposing on such corporations the requirement of a specific percentage of stock ownership by United States citizens. Further discussion during this hearing indicated
that the bill's aircraft registration requirements were patterned after a provision contained in the United States
Shipping Act of 1916.3 Congress in fact relied heavily on
United States maritime law precedents in developing the
1926 Act. 3
2-,
Bureau of Civil Air Navigation in the Dept. of Commerce: Hearings on H. R. 10522
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 51
(1924).
" Id. (remarks of Mr. Burness).
' See H.R. REP. No. 572, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1926). A portion of the report reads as follows:
The provisions ... are not unique or unprecedented. In practically
every case each provision has a precedent in an existing provision of
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A 1925 report from the Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce accompanied a Senate bill3 2 con-

taining the definition of United States citizen and confirmed that the citizenship requirement was based on a
similar requirement in the United States Shipping Act of
1916 (the "Shipping Act")." The report further indicated that the citizenship requirement, at least as it applied to aircraft registration, was also derived from
provisions of the Convention Relating to the Regulation
of Aerial Navigation (the "Paris Convention").3 4 However, the lingering concern with United States security in
wartime seemed pervasive. In explaining the rationale belaw, and is modeled upon and often paraphrased from it. Usually
these existing provisions are those of the marine navigation laws.
This is natural for the reason that air space, with its absence of fixed
roads and tracks and aircraft with their ease of maneuver, present as
to transportation practical and legal problems similar to those
presented by transportation by vessels upon the high seas.
Id.
- S. REP. No. 76, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1925).
H.R. REP. No. 1262, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1925); see Shipping Act of 1916,
Pub. L. No. 64-260, § 2, 39 Stat. 728, 729 (current version of 75% citizenship
requirement for registration of vessels engaged in coastwise trade, 51% for international trade, codified at 46 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The Shipping Act of 1916 provided that:
[W]ithin the meaning of this chapter no corporation, partnership, or
association shall be deemed a citizen of the United States unless the
controlling interest therein is owned by citizens of the United States,
and, in the case of a corporation, unless its president and managing
directors are citizens of the United States and the corporation itself
is organized under the laws of the United States or of a State, Territory, District, or possession thereof.
Id.; see infra note 88.
SH.R. REP. No. 1262, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1925); see Convention Relating
to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, art. 7, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 (the
United States was a signatory to the Convention, but never ratified it). Chapter II,
article 7 of the Paris Convention provided that:
No aircraft shall be entered on the register of one of the contracting
States unless it belongs wholly to nationals of such State. No incorporated company can be registered as the owner of an aircraft unless
it possesses the nationality of the State in which the aircraft is registered, unless the president or chairman of the company and at least
two-thirds of the directors possess such nationality, and unless the
company fulfills all other conditions which may be prescribed by the
laws of the said State.
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hind the citizenship requirement, the report stated that
since aircraft registered in the United States would be
called upon to serve as an auxiliary air force in wartime, at
least seventy-five percent of the interest in the corporations owning such aircraft should be held by United States
citizens .
During Senate debate over the bill which was to become
the 1926 Act, the bill's sponsor noticed that for a corporation owning aircraft to qualify as a United States citizen,
three-fourths or more of the board of directors of the corporation must be United States citizens. In lieu of this requirement a two-thirds standard was proposed and
agreed to. The proponent of the change believed the
three-fourths standard was too restrictive. 6
The final provision enacted into law continued the twothirds requirement, yet only required fifty-one percent
voting stock ownership by United States citizens in United
States corporations.3 7 The latter was apparently a reflection of the Shipping Act. A decade later, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 contained a more restrictive
H.R. REP. No. 1262, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1925).
Registered aircraft of the United States will serve as an auxiliary air
force in time of war. It is, therefore, desirable that such aircraft be in
fact controlled by citizens of the United States in order that possession of them may be readily obtained by the United States in time of
war and that the aircraft be in suitable condition. The Secretary of
Commerce and representatives of the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy agreed that it was desirable, in the case of corporate
owners, that at least 75 percent of the interest in the corporation
should be held by citizens of [the] United States, for the reason that
corporations created under our laws, but in fact foreign controlled,
should not be able to possess craft that fly the United States flag and
should be a part of our air-fleet auxiliary in time of war.
Id.
Sen. Willis stated:
It has been brought to my notice that there is at least one instance in
which there is an organization greatly interested in aircraft production which could not quite comply with that requirement, where it is
provided that three-fourths or more of the board of directors shall
be individual citizens of the United States, but could comply with it if
it were amended so as to provide for two-thirds.

'" 67 CONG. REC. S923 (Dec. 16, 1925).

Id.7 S. REP. No. 41, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 § 10(a) (1925) (the citizenship re-

quirement was enacted as § 3(a) of the 1926 Act).
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percentage of voting stock ownership of seventy-five percent, also based on maritime precedent. 38 It is also interesting to note that the fifty-one percent requirement of
the 1926 Act related only to "voting stock controlled by
citizens of the United States." A Senate bill provision requiring United States citizen ownership of two-thirds of
the corporate stock whether it be voting or nonvoting was
rejected. 3 Arguably, administrative interpretations permitting non-United States citizens to hold larger nonvoting stock percentages than required voting stock
percentages are consistent with this legislative
background.
A 1934 amendment to the 1926 Act relaxed citizenship
requirements with respect to aircraft registration. 40 This
amendment permitted the Secretary of Commerce to
"grant limited registration to aircraft owned by aliens
under such conditions as he may by regulation prescribe,
but aircraft granted such limited registration shall not be
permitted to engage in interstate or foreign air commerce." 4 l Secretary of Commerce Roper stated in the
Senate report accompanying the change that such registration requests were frequently received and in most
cases there was no good reason for denying them. 42 NonUnited States citizens were not permitted to engage in air
commerce. This commercial activity was preserved for
United States citizens only, in keeping with United States
protectionist policies.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (the "1938 Act") excluded the limited liberalized alien registration provision
of the 1934 amendment.4 3 The Federal Aviation Act of

11

See Merchant Marine Act, Pub. L. No. 66-261, § 38, 41 Stat. 988, 1008
(1920); see infra text accompanying note 48.
." See H.R. REP. No. 1162, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1926).
4" 1934 Amendments to Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 73-418, 48
Stat. 1113.
41 Id at 1113-14 (amending § 3(a) of the 1926 Act).
42 S. REP. No. 1142, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1934).
41 See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, Pub. L. No. 76-706, 52 Stat. 977,
1005 (current version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(b) (1982)). Section 501(b) of the
1938 Act provided that:
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1958 (the "1958 Act" or "Federal Aviation Act") reenacted the provision regarding registration as well as retaining the citizenship definition contained in the 1938
Act.

44

From 1926 to 1977, the aircraft registration provisions
of United States aviation law remained in force in essentially the same form. The exception was the limited authority provided to aliens to register aircraft and, of
course, the reflection of the changes as to the requirement
of stock ownership which occurred in 1938. An amendment to the 1958 Act reinstated the alien registration authority, which had been deleted from the 1938 Act,
without the commercial use limitation, but limited it only
to foreign citizens who were permanent United States
residents .45
While the citizenship requirements for aircraft registration were being relaxed, the same was not true for the requirements of ownership in United States air carriers by
non-United States citizens. Thus, a two-track approach to
United States citizenship requirements began to emerge,
made possible, in part, by the emergence of the concept
of "air carrier" as a definitional entity. Senator McCarAn aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if (1) It is owned by a citizen of the United States and is not registered under the laws of any foreign country; or
(2) It is an aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State, Territory, or a possession of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or of a political subdivision thereof.
Id.
Section 1(13) of the 1938 Act defined "Citizen of the United States" as:
(a) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or of one of its
possessions, or (b) a partnership of which each member is such an
individual, or (c) a corporation or association created or organized
under the laws of the United States

.

. .,

of which the president and

two-thirds or more of the board of directors and other managing
officers thereof are such individuals and in which at least 75 per centurn of the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons who are
citizens of the United States or of one of its possessions.
Id. at 978 (current version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1982)).
44 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 501, 72 Stat. 771
(current version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401 (1982)).
4 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 977, 1005
(current version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(b) (1982)).
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ran, in commenting on the definition proposed in the
1938 Act, stated that "[t]he most important terms defined
in this section are 'air carrier' and 'air transportation.'
These terms delimit the person to whom the Act applies. ' 4 6 The term "air carrier," defined in section 1(2)
47 did not appear in
of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
the Air Commerce Act of 1926 as amended. This is important because the "air carrier" definition requires
United States citizen ownership.48
4, H.R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938).
47 Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 977, 977 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(3)

(1982)).
4, The most revealing comment rationalizing what would emerge as the twotrack approach to United States citizenship requirements appeared during a discussion at a 1937 House hearing on bills relating to the enactment of the 1938
Act. Mr. Mulligan of the Commerce Department Solicitor's Office stated:
I would like to invite the attention of the committee to another reference of some historical and practical importance. It concerns section
303(d) in which it is provided that the holders of 51 percent of the
voting interest be controlled by persons who are citizens of the
United States for air-carrier operations.
While such a percentage is required under the provisions of the Air Commerce
Act for purposes of determining the nationality of owners of United States registered aircraft, it is at least open to question whether such a percentage should
suffice for air carrier operations receiving economic support from the Government.

It is believed that serious consideration should be given to the
water carrier precedent of requiring at least a 75 percent ownership,
on the part of our nationals, before engaging in the operation of
American registered vessels. The differentiation between stock ownership and stock control has been so clearly pointed out by the Securities and Exchange Commission and leading writers on
corporation finance that this matter should be given careful thought.
If you will go back to the 1926 Act, you may remember that the
Senate draft of the 1926 statute provided for 66 2A percent stock
ownership for aircraft registration. The bill was amended in conference, and the Act provides for only 51 percent of voting control.
But voting control is a nebulous thing.
Aviation: Hearing on H. R. 5234 and H. R. 4652 Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 261 (1937) (emphasis supplied).
President Roosevelt supported protecting the domestic air transportation industry from foreign competition:
In view of the immense market afforded by the United States, with
its correspondingly great contribution to the volume of passengers,
mails, and express moving to foreign countries, it is considered essential that a fair share of the air lines serving the United States be
controlled by our nationals.
See S. Doc. No. 15, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1935) (Federal Aviation Commis-
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Efforts by the United States government to deregulate

the airline industry in the late 1970s 4 9 served as the cata-

lyst for two important policy changes in United States law,
both of which reflected the United States government's
"two-track" approach to the United States citizenship requirements. In 1977, the Federal Aviation Act was
amended to permit registration of aircraft by owners who
did not meet the stringent requirements of the definition
of United States citizen, provided such aircraft were based
and primarily used in the United States. 50 The second
sion: Message From the President of the United States Transmitting Pursuant to
Law, a Report of the Federal Aviation Commission Containing its Recommendations of a Broad Policy covering All Phases of Aviation and the Relation of the
United States Thereto).
Under provisions of the 1958 Act it had been unlawful "for any foreign air carrier or person controlling a foreign air carrier to acquire control in any manner
whatsoever of any citizen of the United States substantially engaged in the busi49 U.S.C. app. § 1378(a)(4) (1982). The act defined
ness of aeronautics ....
control as:
any person owning beneficially 10 per centum or more of the voting
securities or capital, as the case may be, of an air carrier shall be
presumed to be in control of such air carrier unless the board finds
otherwise. As used herein, beneficial ownership of 10 per centum of
the voting securities of a carrier means ownership of such amount of
its outstanding voting securities as entitles the holder thereof to cast
10 per centum of the aggregate votes which the holders of all the
outstanding voting securities of such carrier are entitled to cast.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1378(f) (1982). Moreover, interlocking corporate relationships,
as applied to the United States air carrier industry, were generally banned by the
act. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1379 (1982). However, such prohibitions were eliminated effective January 1989, with changes in the regulatory structure of the Department of Transportation. See id. § 1378.
41, Lowenfeld, Deregulation of Aviation in the United States, in ESSAYS IN AIR LAW
155 (A. Kean ed. 1982).
m,Act of Nov. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-163, § 14, 91 Stat. 1278, 1283 (current
version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(b) (1982)). The task of defining "based and
primarily used in the United States" has been charged to the FAA, which holds
rulemaking authority delegated by the Secretary of Transportation. The current
regulation promulgated by the FAA provides that:
(b) For the purposes of registration, an aircraft is based and primarily used in the United States if the flight hours accumulated within
the United States amount to at least 60 percent of the total flight
hours of the aircraft during (1) For aircraft registered on or beforeJanuary 1, 1980, the 6-calendar month period beginning on January 1, 1980, and each 6-calendar month period thereafter; and
(2) For aircraft registered after January 1, 1980, the period consist-
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change, occurring in 1980, permitted United States carriers to use "dry leased" aircraft (aircraft without crew) in
United States domestic operations. 5' This latter change
represented a break with the long standing policy that
only United States registered aircraft could be used by
United States citizens in the air transportation business in
the United States.
The limited contemporary importance of the national
defense rationale underlying the historical restriction on
registration of aircraft and the increased emphasis on the
sale of United States manufactured aircraft is evidenced
by the comments of one senator during debate over the
1977 amendment of section 501, the aircraft registration
provision of the Federal Aviation Act. Senator Cannon
stated that expanding registrability of aircraft was necessary to provide "more favorable possibilities for sale of
United States-manufactured aircraft both to foreign nationals residing in the United States and foreign corporations doing business in the United States."' 52 The creation
of the Civil Reserve Act Fleet ("CRAF") program also
contributed to a diminishment of national security
53
concerns.
ing of the remainder of the registration month and the succeeding 6calendar months and each 6-calendar month period thereafter.
(c) For the purpose of this section, only those flight hours accumulated during non-stop (except for stops in emergencies or for purposes of refueling) flight between two points in the United States,
even if the aircraft is outside of the United States during part of the
flight, are considered flight hours accumulated within the United
States
14 C.F.R. § 47.9(b)-(c) (1989). For a general discussion of the development of
this provision, see McMeen & Sarchio, Administrative Flexibility and the FAA: The

Background and Development of United States Registration of Foreign-OwnedAircraft, 46 J.

AIR L. & CoM. 1, 15 (1980).
-,See International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-192, § 20, 94 Stat. 35, 43 (1980) (current version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b)
(1982)).
.
123 CONG. REC. 34,663 (remarks of Senator Cannon), quoted in McMeen &

Sarchio, Administrative Flexibility and the FAA: The Background and Development of
United States Registrationof Foreign-OwnedAircraft, 46J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 15 (1980).

-- CRAF is composed of those aircraft which have been contractually committed to the Department of Defense to provide civilian support for emergency military airlift operations. The program was created under authority of the Defense
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From the foregoing brief outline of the legislative history relating to the requirement for and definition of
United States citizenship in United States aviation law, it
is clear that the United States government was convinced
that the national interest demanded a limitation on foreign ownership and control of the United States aviation
industry. This concern has ebbed and flowed with United
States national security and economic tides and has been
mirrored in the administration of the law by United States
government agencies. Secretary of Transportation Skinner provided the most recent pronouncement on the subject, vowing "to enforce the Act's requirements
vigorously," and to "maintain a strong, independent system of U.S. air carriers free of foreign control or undue
influence. ' 54 Secretary Skinner did not address aircraft
registration requirements.
In a statement before the House Subcommittee on Aviation on October 4, 1989, 55 Secretary Skinner reaffirmed
his position on the United States citizenship requirements
for air carriers. The Secretary acknowledged the potential
benefits of foreign investment, but continued to assert the
need to comply with congressional intent and the letter of
Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2170 (1982)). It should, however, be noted
that there is a requirement that aircraft eligible for the program be owned or controlled by U.S. air carriers and registered in the United States. See Memorandum
of Understanding Between the Department of Defense and the Department of
Transportation Concerning the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program, May 7, 1981, at
1-2.
.4

Nominations -

DOT; Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1989). In response to a specific question
in this regard, Secretary Skinner stated during his confirmation proceedings:
I understand that the Federal Aviation Act already contains safeguards to prevent unwarranted foreign ownership of U.S. carriers.
The Act requires that any U.S. air carrier be both 75% owned and
entirely controlled by citizens of the U.S. Thus, I am told that even
where the numerical requirement regarding stock ownership is met,
the Department examines a prospective owner carefully to ensure
that no foreign entity will be in a position to exert control over a
U.S. air carrier.

the House Sub',Statement of Samuel K. Skinner, Secretary of Transportation, Before
comm. on Aviation, Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 10 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 4

(1989).
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the law for the citizenship requirements.56
II.
A.

ITS INTERPRETATION
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Air Carriers

As noted, the Federal Aviation Act defines a United
States air carrier as any citizen of the United States who
undertakes, whether directly or indirectly, by a lease or
other arrangement, to engage in air transportation. Thus,
a United States air carrier must be a "citizen" of the
United States. In interpreting the term "citizen," the
United States Department of Transportation (the "DOT"
or "Department") and the predecessor economic regulatory agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board (the "CAB" or
"Board"), construed the definitional language relating to
corporate structure as requiring not only that the requi-I5Id. at 7-8. Because the Northwest-Wings merger represented both citizenship and debt concerns due to the leveraged buy-out provisions of the arrangement, the Secretary stated that it and similar arrangements will receive close caseby-case scrutiny. Id.
The restrictions upon airline sales are increasing, and some critics fear the result will be a cutting of corners on safety. Legislation is currently pending before
Congress, in the forms of S. 1277 and H.R. 3443, both of which restrict the
purchase of airlines by leveraged buy-out deals. H.R. 3443 passed the House on
November 1, 1989, and is pending on the Senate Calendar. S. 1277 was placed
on the Senate Calendar on October 18, 1989, and is still pending.
Timothy Pettee, of Merrill Lynch, testified to the House Subcommittee on Aviation concerning his belief that cutting back on leveraged buy-outs and restricting
foreign equity investment, as was done in the Northwest-Wings situation, is dangerous. Mr. Pettee testified that such measures leave airlines short of sources of
capital. Leveraged Buyouts andForeign Ownership Interest in U.S. Airlines: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 10 1st Cong.,

1st Sess. 11, 11-12 (1989) (testimony presented by Timothy Pettee, First Vice
President, Airline Industry Analyst, Merrill Lynch Capital Markets).
Futhermore, Mr. Pettee states that an increase in leveraged transactions will not
have an effect upon the levels of safety in the airline industry because "there is no
empirical evidence which correlates the degree of safety of a carrier and its level
of debt and debt service." Id. at 8.
However, proponents of the legislation, such as Congressman Bob Carr from
Michigan, believe that leveraged takeovers raise considerable concerns as to
whether the airline will be able to expend the funds necessary to maintain the
aircraft fleet with a sufficient commitment to safety. Carr Warns Against Airline
Takeovers: Says Northwest Deal Must Include Other Airlines, News Release by
Congressman Bob Carr, 6th Congressional District, Michigan (Oct. 2, 1989).
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site percentage of United States voting interest be owned
by United States citizens, but further, that there should be
no foreign control of such carrier by a non-United States
citizen.
As early as 1940, the CAB indicated its intent to ensure
that "[t]he shadow of substantial foreign influence" did
not exist in a corporation that sought to qualify as a "citizen of the United States" as defined in section 1(13) of
the 1938 Act. 57 The Board therefore proposed to look
behind the form of an air carrier's management to ensure
that its substance was in fact "under the control of citizens

of the United States. "58

In examining the definition of a United States citizen, it
is possible for administrative agencies to conclude that
the definitional reference in the corporate composition element relating to "voting stock" permits foreign investors
to hold nonvoting stock 59 in larger percentages than votSee Uraba, Medellin & Cent. Airways Inc. - Certificate of Public Convenience & Necessity, 2 C.A.B. 334, 337-338 (1940).
.5 Id. at 337. One of the leading administrative decisions in this area explains
the Board's position:
In examining the control aspect for purposes of determining citizenship, we look beyond the bare technical requirements to see if the
foreign interest has the power - either directly or indirectly - to
influence the directors, officers or stockholders. We have found
control to embrace every form of control and to include negative as
well as positive influence; we have recognized that a dominating influence may be exercised in ways other than through a vote.
In re Page Avjet Corp., CAB Order No. 83-7-5, at 2-3 (July 1, 1983) (citations
omitted).
r- For example, the FAA's Chief Counsel's office has taken the position that
Congress used the term "voting interest" rather than "stock" or "interest in a
corporation" to describe the requisite seventy-five percent involvement of United
States citizens in a corporation deemed to be a United States citizen. A voting
interest in a corporation is a particular kind of corporate involvement and is not
necessarily identical to economic ownership or economic participation in the corporation. Rather, Congress appears to have preferred the concept of United
ecoStates citizen control over corporate decision-making to United States citizen
nomic ownership in or benefit from the corporation, in defining which corporawith and
tions may be considered citizens of the United States. This is consistent
that the
complements the United States citizen control that is insured by requiring of the
"citizen
corporate
a
of
directors
of
board
the
of
two-thirds
president and
believe that foreign
United States" be United States citizens. Consequently, I
does
ownership of more than twenty-five percent of the stock of a corporation
the
of
"citizen
of
definition
Act's
the
from
corporation
a
not, in itself, exclude
57
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ing stock. However, as apparent from recent events, if the
nonvoting ownership allows the foreign investor to exercise such a degree of control as to nullify the United
States controlling interests, or to restrict the United
States carrier's operations to suit the needs of the particular foreign investor, the Board could order divestiture of
the foreign investment for failure to fulfill the citizenship
requirement.60
Several administrative decisions illustrate some of the
machinations the United States government has employed
in determining whether or not a United States air carrier
is, in fact, a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the statute. In Willye Peter Daetwyler,6 t the CAB decided that mere compliance with the technical
requirements of the 1958 Act's definition of "citizen of
the United States" will not qualify a corporation as a
United States citizen when the potential for foreign control exists.
This case focused on whether Daetwyler, a
citizen of Switzerland, could actually be considered fit to
control a United States air carrier. Daetwyler was one of
three directors of a carrier corporation, and owned
twenty-five percent of its stock. As required by the 1958
Act, United States citizens owned the remaining seventyfive percent of the carrier's stock, and United States citizens comprised two-thirds of the corporation's board of
directors and other managing officers. 6 2
The CAB ruled that because Daetwyler was "in a position of control," the carrier did not qualify as a "citizen of
United States." Voting interest is the determinative factor. Letter from Edward
P. Faberman, FAA Deputy Chief Counsel, to Sheila M. Harvey of Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge (Oct. 21, 1982) (discussing interpretation of FAA § 101(16)
in connection with Part 135, air taxi/commercial operator certificates).
"' In re Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc., DOT Order
No. 89-9-51 (Sept. 29, 1989) (Because KLM, a Dutch corporation, owned almost
54% of the equity interest in Wings, DOT required KLM's divestment of all but
25% of the total interest in Wings before Wings could acquire Northwest
Airlines).
11 58 CAB, 118 (1971).
62 Id. at 119.
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the United States" under the 1958 Act. 63 The Board concluded that the section 101 (13) definition of United States
citizen did not include "a corporation meeting the bare
minimum percent of ownership and directorships held by
United States citizens, where control in fact lies in foreign
citizens."64
In finding that the carrier corporation did not qualify as
a citizen of the United States under the 1958 Act, the CAB
rejected the literal interpretation of section 101(13),
which provides that seventy-five percent of the voting interest must be "owned or controlled by persons who are
citizens of the United States."'65 The Board decided the
definition should be interpreted conjunctively, and required that air carriers be owned and controlled by citizens of the United States. 66 The CAB cited its earlier
decision in Uraba and the legislative history of the statutory definition of "citizen of the United States" which, in
the Board's view, indicated that Congress intended that
have "actual control" over United
United States citizens
67
States air carriers.
Yet, in what appeared to be a move to accommodate
foreign interests in air carriers, the Board's decision in In
re Page Avjet Corp.68 approved foreign ownership of non,- Id. at 120.
" Id. The CAB came to this conclusion because:
1) The carrier was a "direct successor" to another Daetwyler corporation and was "created wholly at the instance of Daetwyler";
2) with respect to stock ownership and directorships, Daetwyler had
retained "the maximum control technically permitted under the literal terms of section 101(13)";
3) the carrier "will continue to do business as part of the system of
Daetwyler-controlled companies"; and
4) all of the stockholders, directors, and managing officers either
had close personal relationships with Daetwyler or were employees
of other Daetwyler-controlled companies.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added); accord Premiere Airlines Fitness Investigation, CAB Order No. 82-5-11, at 3 (May 5, 1982).
67 Daetwyler, 58 CAB, at 121 n.8.
" CAB Order No. 84-8-12 (Aug. 2, 1984).
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voting stock in a United States air carrier. 69 Page, in response to a CAB order to either cease operations or to
develop a reorganization plan which met the citizenship
requirements, submitted a plan for the Board's
evaluation.
In reviewing the plan, the CAB focused on the rights of
the nonvoting shareholders. While the voting stockholders had the right to elect the company's officers and directors and to exercise control over the 'day-to-day
operations of the air carrier, the nonvoting stockholders
held the right to exercise control only in "extraordinary
circumstances." Even so, the plan required a majority of
the nonvoting stockholders to approve a merger, acquisition or consolidation of the corporation, as well as to initiate and approve a corporate dissolution or liquidation.70
The CAB applied an "actual control" criterion for qualification as a United States citizen. The Board determined
that Page did not qualify as a citizen since the nonvoting
stockholders had the power to exert a dominating influence over the corporation. The CAB concluded that "[i]f
the nonvoting stockholders disapprove of the way that the
officers and directors conduct the company's affairs, they
can vote for dissolution of the company. Given the nonvoting shareholders' power, it could be expected that the
officers, directors
and voting stockholders would follow
7
their wishes." '
The Board did, however, allow Page to submit a revised
plan designed to create a new corporation with two
classes of stockholders. One group of United States citizens would own preferred voting stock, while the other
group would own nonvoting common stock. The plan included a buy-out provision, which, upon the occurrence
of certain events, required the United States stockholders
!,Id. DOT described this case as defining the "outer limits of what may be
permitted under the [1958] Act." In re Intera Arctic Servs., Inc., DOT Order No.
87-8-43, at II (Aug. 18, 1987).
- Page Avjet, Citizenship, CAB Order No. 83-7-5, at 4 (July 1, 1983).
71 Id.
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to buy the common stock at its "fair market value." The
Page plan defined "fair market value" as one-half of the
sum of the net tangible book value per share, plus six
times the earnings per share.72 The CAB concluded that
this plan would meet the citizenship requirement imposed
by the 1958 Act.7 3
More recently, in a variation of the stock ownership
standard, the DOT permitted Transpacific Enterprises
("Transpacific") to acquire twenty percent of the voting
stock of America West Airlines ("America West"), a
United States air carrier, in Transpacific Enterprises, Inc. and
America West Airlines, Inc. 74 Transpacific, a United States
corporation, is a subsidiary of Ansett Transportation Industries Limited ("ATI"), an Australian corporation
owned by two other Australian corporations.
The Transpacific stock purchase was structured to comply with the United States citizenship requirement. By
owning only twenty percent of America West's stock,
Transpacific would not violate the citizen ownership requirement. However, to prevent the possibility of a future
violation of the citizenship requirement, America West
amended its certificate of incorporation to prohibit foreign citizens from owning more than twenty-five percent
of America West's voting stock, and to authorize its board
of directors to take all necessary steps to maintain
America West's status as a United States citizen under the
1958 Act.75
Although the Department approved the transaction, it
did so with reservations. The DOT required further examination of other links between America West and affiliates in Transpacific's corporate structure including
America West's lease of nine of its seventy aircraft from
corporations owned by ATI's parent corporation and
CAB Order No. 84-8-12, at 2 (Aug. 2, 1984).
Id.
7, DOT Order No. 87-8-31 (Aug. 13, 1987).
75 Id. "The amendment ... authorizes the carrier's board of directors to take
all steps that may be necessary to ensure that America West remains a U.S. citizen
under the terms of the Act." Id.
71
7.
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Transpacific's preexisting ownership of a small quantity of
America West's convertible preferred stock.76
The Department ultimately permitted Transpacific and
America West to conclude the stock purchase, but neglected to provide a definitive ruling on whether America
West would continue to meet the citizenship requirement
under the 1958 Act. The DOT subsequently advised the
a
parties that it was satisfied that America West remained
77
Act.
the
of
purposes
the
for
United States citizen
Finally, the Department's decision in In re Intera Arctic
Services, Inc. appears to be a retreat from its decision in the
Page Avjet case. 78 The Department first tentatively ruled
that Intera Arctic Services ("IAS") did not qualify as a
United States citizen because it failed "to place itself beyond the control of its Canadian affiliates." '79 The
grounds for the DOT's tentative ruling were reiterated in
the final decision: 1) the broad buy-out provision conferred "virtually unconstrained discretion" on the nonvoting stockholders to invoke or threaten to invoke the
buy-out provision; 2) the dissolution provisions of IAS'
Articles of Incorporation operated to insulate the voting
stockholders from the risk of failure, and also from the
chance to share in the corporation's success; and 3) the
two United States citizens on whom IAS relied to satisfy
the numerical requirements of section 101(16) were "key
employees" of Intera Technologies, Inc. ('*'IT"), the Canadian parent corporation of IAS, making them "ready
conduits" for IT's exercise of control over IAS. 80
The Department's ruling is of particular significance
since IAS was formed as a domestic corporation by its
parent IT, with specific regard for the PageAvjet decision.
Id. at 5.
United States-Australia Service Proceeding, DOT Order No. 89-10-2 (Sept.
25, 1989). "America West, a Delaware corporation, has previously been found to
be a citizen of the United States within the meaning of section 101(16) of the
Federal Aviation Act." Id.
7, DOT Order No. 87-8-43 (Aug. 18, 1987).
79 DOT Order No. 87-3-32, at 3 (Mar. 9, 1987).
.1 Id.
76
17
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IT held all of the nonvoting common stock, individual
United States citizens held three-fourths of the preferred
voting stock, and a buy-out provision allowed IT to sell its
stock back to IAS upon the occurrence of certain events.
The DOT affirmed its tentative findings in its final order, focusing on the potential for foreign control that the
CAB condemned in Daetwyler. The Department concluded that the IAS plan mirrored that of Daetwyler rather
than Page Avjet. In light of the strong similarity between
the IAS and Page Avjet ownership structures, the Intera
Arctic holding suggests that the DOT may no longer consider the Page Avjet decision to be good law. 8 '
The DOT recently ordered a limitation of foreign control before allowing the purchase of a domestic airline in
82
In re Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc.
The Department expressed "significant concern" over the
degree of foreign participation in Wings Holdings, Inc.
("Wings"). Before permitting Wings to acquire Northwest
Airlines, the DOT required KLM, a Dutch airline corporation, to relinquish its equity investment in Wings to the
extent it exceeded twenty-five percent of the total interest
in Wings.8" KLM and other foreign investors owned less
than twenty-five percent of the voting stock, thereby appearing to fulfill the citizenship requirement of section
101(16).84 However, the DOT was concerned with the
potential for KLM to exercise control over Northwest
DOT Order No. 87-8-43, at 11.
There are, however, enough differences between the Page and IAS
situations that it will not be necessary for us to consider here
whether or not we would have decided that case the same way that
our predecessor agency did. Suffice it to say that, in our view and we
think, the Board's, the PageAvjet precedent constitutes the outer lim-

its of what may be permitted under the Act. Because citizenship decisions under the Act are based on an evaluation of all of the facts
and circumstances of each individual case taken together, those who
attempt to pattern their conduct on the fringes of what is lawful
often overstep the bounds of what is permitted. This is such a case.
Id. (footnote omitted).
S2 DOT Order No. 89-9-51 (Sept. 29, 1989).
Id. at 8.
, Id. at 4.
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through Wings.85
In assessing what it considered to be "actual control,"
the DOT distinguished debt investments from equity investments. The DOT views debt agreements with foreign
entities as standard covenants which "are clearly aimed at
protecting the debtholders' interests," and which do not
restrict the regular operations of carriers.86 Citing Page
Avjet and Intera Arctic as precedent,8 7 the DOT stated that
a foreign entity which owns "a large share in a carrier's
equity poses citizenship problems, even where the interest
does not take the form of voting stock, particularly if there
are other ties to the foreign entity." 8 8 The DOT felt that
since KLM held a 56.74% equity interest in Wings, KLM
had more incentive to participate in the business decisions
of Wings in order to protect KLM's investment.89
Furthermore, as a preferred stockholder, KLM could
restrict securities offerings by Wings, and could "block
any amendments to the Certificates of Incorporation or
Designation that would materially and adversely affect the
specified designations, preferences, or special rights of its
preferred stock." 90 KLM had the right to appoint a director to the Wings board of directors who would not be restricted in participating in Northwest's decision-making.
Also, KLM had the right to name a three-person committee to advise Wings on Northwest's financial affairs. 9 '
Before permitting the acquisition of Northwest by
Wings, the DOT ordered several compliance measures: 1)
.1 Id. The DOT stated, "This case raises our concern regarding the other half
of our citizenship test: the requirement that a carrier (and its parent company) in
fact be under the actual control of U.S. citizens." Id. The DOT's concern
stemmed from the combination of KLM's sheer financial stake in Wings, its rights
as a preferred stockholder to take steps to protect that interest, and its apparently
unrestricted right to influence Northwest's management through an advisory
committee. Id.
'
87

Id. at 5.

Id. at 6.

Id. at 6 n.8.
"" Id. at 6.
" Id. at 6-7.
"

Id. at 7.
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termination of KLM's right to call the committee to monitor Northwest's financial affairs; 2) recusal of KLM's representative on the board of directors in specific
circumstances; and 3) Northwest's agreement to file reports concerning changes of ownership of shareholders
and concerning nonstandard agreements made between
KLM and Northwest. The Department also ordered KLM
to reduce its equity share to twenty-five percent of the total equity in Wings within a six-month period. These
measures were calculated to eliminate the possibility of
actual control by the foreign nonvoting shareholder.
In November 1989, the DOT issued a final order in In re
North American Airlines, issuing a section 401(d)(1) certificate of public convenience and necessity. However, the
order also specifically directed North American Airlines
("NAA") to notify the Department if a non-United States
citizen acquired any equity interest in the airline.92 Citizenship concerns arose when the DOT learned that
although NAA was fully owned and controlled by United
States citizens, El Al Israel Airlines held an option to acquire 24.9% of NAA's outstanding common stock. 93 The
DOT found no justification for an adverse citizenship
holding, however, since United States citizens held at
least seventy-five percent of the ownership and control of
NAA. 94 Furthermore, the DOT concluded that the existence of a leasing agreement between El Al and NAA had
no adverse impact on the citizenship issue.9 5
In re North American Airlines, DOT Order No. 89-11-26 (Nov. 14, 1989).
In re North American Airlines, DOT Order No. 89-11-8 (Nov. 6, 1989).
Id. at 7.
115 Id. at 7. It is also important to note that an application pending before DOT
at the time of publication of this Article addresses the citizenship issue. On July
14, 1989, Discovery Airway, Inc. filed an application for fitness. Six of its seven
board members are citizens of the U.S. and more than 85% of its voting stock is
owned by U.S. citizens. In re Discovery Airways, No. 46393, at 3 (filed July 14,
1989). On November 20, 1989, Discovery filed a motion to cause the DOT to act
immediately upon the July 14th application.
An Italian citizen holds approximately 15% of the voting stock in Discovery.
Approximately 75% of the stock is held by a United States citizen who has ties to a
foreign corporation, Nansay Corporation. Discovery filed a motion for expedited
action and agreement to imposition of conditions on November 20, 1989. In that
1-2
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On December 21, 1989, the DOT issued yet another
citizenship order.96 In In re Application Discovery Airways,
the DOT raised no objection to an Italian shareholder
holding fifteen percent of both the voting common stock
and nonvoting participating stock. However, the DOT required that the Italian citizen be removed from all executive functions at Discovery in order to lessen his present
executive control, since section 101(16) reserves such
control for United States citizens.97 The Department also
ordered that lease agreements with British Aerospace be
filed with the DOT to determine British Aerospace's relationship with Discovery. 98 This order was finalized January 29, 1990.91
In the Discovery decision, the DOT used a strict standard
of scrutiny in determining who is to be considered a
United States citizen. If a United States citizen has strong
ties with a foreign corporation, and if the DOT considers
these ties to weaken the individual's ability to exert control over the air carrier, then the DOT will determine that
the citizenship requirement has not been met. Consequently, the Department required the removal of three
Discovery board members who are American citizens and
who have affiliations with a Japanese company.' 0 0 The
Department also ordered a hearing for the sole purpose
of determining whether ownership of seventy-five percent
of the voting stock by a United States citizen with strong
motion, Discovery agreed to place the principal shareholder's stock into an irrevocable voting trust and agreed that all board members with Nansay past or present
ties will resign. Discovery also offered to create an Executive Committee to ensure that the company's president, a United States citizen, has all power and authority necessary to perform his duties. The DOT has not yet concluded its
proceedings as of December 6, 1989, despite Discovery's assertions that the delay
is causing it serious economic harm.
In re Application of Discovery Airways, DOT Order No. 89-12-41 (Dec. 21,
1989).
97

Id. at 14-15.

Id. at 15.
In re Application of Discovery Airways, DOT Order No. 90-1-60 (Jan. 29,
1990).
I0 In re Application of Discovery Airways, DOT Order No. 89-12-41 (Dec. 21,
1989).
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affiliations to a Japanese corporation is a violation of the
citizenship requirement, and if so, whether divestiture is
necessary.' 0 '
While the CAB and DOT were and are continuing to
thrust to and fro on the economic battlefield of what constitutes United States citizenship for purposes of qualifying as a United States air carrier under the law, the FAA, a
modal element of the DOT, has been moving towards accommodating foreign interests in United States registered
aircraft.
B.

United States Aircraft Registration Requirements

The question of citizenship looms decisively not only in
determinations with respect to United States air carriers,
but also in connection with the ability to register aircraft
in the United States. Under the provisions of the 1958
Act, an aircraft which is eligible for registration in the
United States cannot be operated therein unless it is registered in accordance with the Act. 10 2 The definition of
citizenship contained in the 1958 Act, which is applicable
to air carriers, is equally applicable in determining
whether an individual or corporation may register an aircraft in the United States. The interpretation of that definition has differed from the interpretation of exactly the
same provisions for purposes of determining what is, or is
not, a United States air carrier.1 0 3 The FAA has deterId. at 4.
49 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1982).
For instance, the FAA has taken the position that:
In administering Title V of the Act, we read 49 U.S.C. § 1301(16)(c)
to apply only to the issue of control in terms of voting interest of
shareholders, not in terms of the board of directors or other managing officers of a corporation. The only requirement with respect to
these individuals is that two-thirds of them must be citizens of the
United States. Accordingly, the FAA has never required that a corporate applicant for U.S. aircraft registration under 49 U.S.C.
1401(b)(l)(A)(i) demonstrate that the requisite percentage of its
board of directors or managing officers are free from relationships
which might place elements of "control" in a non-citizen entity.
Further, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not consider CAB decisions controlling with respect to issues involving air-
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mined that for purposes of applying the partnership eligibility to the concept of United States citizenship, each
member of the partnership must be an individual. 0 4 The
United States government has gone through a number of
what some have characterized as legal fictions to establish
both the ownership and citizenship requirements for aircraft registration. 0 5 The government has interpreted leverage, finance leases, and voting trusts in an
accommodating manner to satisfy the restrictions imposed with respect to the United States citizenship requirement.' 6 The requirements relating to eligibility for
registration have been so distorted that the Committee of
Aeronautics of the New York State Bar Association suggested that citizenship requirements for aircraft registration may no longer be meaningful.' 0 7 The economic
craft registration, just as FAA decisions in this area do not bind
OST, the successor to the CAB's functions. The two agencies have
different statutory responsibilities, with different concerns to be addressed in determining an operator's citizenship. For example, in
most cases, the FAA requires only that U.S. citizenship be supported
by the certification of the applicant. In contrast, OST performs a
more detailed analysis in pursuit of its own regulatory goals. With
IAS, there is additional conclusive evidence that all voting shareholders, officers and directors are individual U.S. citizens. Consideration of further subtleties as to how such persons might be
influenced by their other interests in non-U.S. companies is not relevant to the registration process. Therefore, the fact that U.S. citizens have interests outside the United States should not be
disqualifying for purposes of aircraft registration.
Letter from Irene E. Howie, FAA Asst. Chief Counsel, Internal Affairs and
Legal Policy Staff, to Gary B. Garofalo and Carl B. Nelson, Jr., at 2-3 (Mar. 9,
1987) (discussing citizenship requirements and their effect upon the continued
eligibility for registration of civil aircraft).
'" See FAA Letter, supra note 11.

See generally Stewart, Obtaining Title and Financing Transport Category Aircraft National and International Implications, 50J. AIR L. & COM. 191, 200-17 (1985).

Id. at 202.
,' See New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Aeronautics, Two Problems in U.S.
Aircraft Registration, at 7 (Apr. 13, 1982) [hereinafter New York City Bar Ass'n].
The committee recommended that section 501 (b) of the FAA Act be amended to:
make United States aircraft registration available without regard to
citizenship, but subject to the following conditions:
(1) that non-citizen registrants validly submit to United States jurisdiction in all matters concerning U.S.-registered aircraft and,
(2) that all U.S. maintenance, operation, safety and airworthiness
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advantage available to the United States in being able to
finance the purchase of new aircraft utilizing foreign
sources of investment may have motivated, at least in part,
the FAA's interpretive position.
Given the evolving legal interpretations of who or what
qualifies as a United States citizen, the time has arrived for
a review of the entire issue. At the very least, it is time to
examine whether the original reasons for restrictive application of the statutory definition of United States citizen
are still valid and in the United States national interest.
III.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS RESOLVING THE CONFLICT OF
INTERPRETATION AND UNITED STATES DOMESTIC
POLICY CONCERNS

Assuming the United States wishes to continue to some
degree its present posture of insulating United States carriers from foreign control, and United States registered
aircraft from foreign "ownership,"'' 0 8 the following
changes in the 1958 Act should be considered. These
changes are not designed to abandon the present United
States policy, but to provide greater flexibility in meeting
possible future aviation industry needs in both the domestic and international arenas. While it is recognized that
statutory changes are not easy to come by, the following
alternatives are suggested as a means of opening a dialogue on this subject.
standards be fully complied with for all U.S. registered aircraft, without regard to the location of such aircraft's use.
It is believed, regarding the latter proposed condition, that no significant "ripple" effect would necessitate other statutory or regulatory changes. Rather, the relevant standards typically would be
applied by virtue of the U.S. registry of an aircraft and the need for U.S. as well as foreign purposes - to keep in effect a current
airworthiness certificate. Finally, we should stress that what is proposed is the elimination of the U.S. citizenship requirement from
section 501 (b), and the regulations thereunder, only; we do not propose the elimination of the Act's definition of a "citizen of the
United States" altogether, in that it continues - at least until the
CAB's sunset - to have other applicability within the Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
," See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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CURRENT LAW

Section 101(16) of the 1958 Act currently defines citizenship as follows:
"Citizen of the United States" means (a) an individual who
is a citizen of the United States or of one of its possessions, or (b) a partnership of which each member is such
an individual, or (c) a corporation or association created
or organized under the laws of the United States or of any
State, territory, or possession of the United States, of
which the president and two-thirds or more of the board
of directors and other managing officers thereof are such
individuals and in which at least 75 per centum of the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of the United States or of one of its possessions. 0 9
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES

Alternative 1
Amend section 101 (16) by deleting from subparagraph (b)
the phrase "such an individual" and substituting in lieu
thereof the phrase "a citizen." [The remainder of the section is unchanged].

Alternative 2
Amend section 101 (16) by deleting from subparagraph (b)
the phrase "such an individual" and substituting the
phrase "a citizen"; by deleting from subparagraph (c) the
phrase "75 per centum" and substituting in lieu thereof
"51 per centum."

Alternative 3
Amend section 101 (16) by deleting from subparagraph (b)
the phrase "such an individual" and substitute in lieu
thereof the phrase "a citizen"; by striking the period at the
end of subparagraph (c) and substituting a semicolon and
adding the following: "Provided, however, the Secretary

I'll,Federal

Aviation Act of 1958, § 101(16), 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1982).
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may waive any of the requirements set forth herein in the
public interest of the United States."
The first suggested alternative to the citizenship definition merely deletes from the present definition the phrase
which has resulted in the prohibition of aircraft registration by corporate partnerships. This alternative becomes
even more necessary in light of a proposed recodification
of the FAA Act, which by its terms deletes the phrase, but
because it is only a recodification and not a substantive
amendment, may result in confusion."10
The second alternative for amending the citizenship
definition also deletes the troublesome language associated with partnerships and returns to the fifty-one percent
criteria for voting stock ownership. The key question in
considering such a change is what advantage or necessity
is associated with maintaining the seventy-five percent
standard? The percentages of stock ownership were derived from United States maritime law. Yet the analogy
with maritime law no longer continues to be relevant, if it
ever was relevant." I There is, however, a domestic policy
1

100TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
49, UNITED STATES CODE, "TRANSPORTATION" 256-57 (Comm.
Print 1988) (the proposed recodification of § 105(c) substitutes the words "other
than a corporation which is a citizen of the United States" for "not a citizen of the
United States" but provides no substantive change).
1 Corporations which seek the benefits of ship registration with the U.S. government are still required to meet certain shareholder citizenship requirements.
Thus, because of cabotage, corporations operating a vessel domestically are required to fulfill a 75% U.S. shareholder ownership threshold for registration purposes. 46 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1982) (46 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1982) was moved to the
Title 46 appendix, 46 U.S.C. app. § 802(a) (Supp. 1 1983)). Those corporations
seeking U.S. registration for purposes of operating in international waters need
only 51% U.S. shareholder ownership. However, a completely foreign owned
corporation is eligible for U.S. documentation provided it is
established under the laws of the United States or of a State ...[and
its] president or other chief executive officer and chairman of its
board of directors are citizens of the United States and no more of
its directors are noncitizens than a minority of the number necessary
to constitute a quorum.
46 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (Supp. 1 1983) (The quoted language first appeared in 46
U.S.C. § 65b(3) (1982) and was then moved to 46 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (Supp. I
1983). Since 1986, the quoted language has been found in 46 U.S.C. §
12102(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1986)).
REPORT FROM THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

REVISION OF TITLE
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issue to be debated - the degree of economic protection
which the United States government should provide to
United States carriers. Is a seventy-five percent of voting
stock ownership requirement necessary if the element of
control in United States citizens is maintained at a lesser
percentage? Does the United States air carrier industry
need an infusion of capital not available in the United
States - particularly in this day and age of the leveraged
buy-out monopoly game now prevalent in the United
States?
Finally, the third alternative, while retaining the present
definition, authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to
waive any of the citizenship definitional requirements if he
finds it in the public interest to do so. This amendment
would give the United States government flexibility on a
case-by-case basis to deal with a number of troublesome
international issues ranging from foreign involvement in
the ownership of United States carriers and aircraft to
cabotage,"1 2 recognizing that the cabotage issue is compli112 See generally, Comment, Air Cabotage: Historical and Modern-Day Perspectives, 45
J. AIR L. & COM. 1059, 1059 (1980). This article defines cabotage as the "carriage
of passengers, cargo, and mail between two points within the territory of the same
nation for compensation or hire." Id.
Air cabotage was first written into international law by the Paris Convention of
1919. Id. at 1060. The resulting Treaty provided, in pertinent part, that "[e]ach
contracting State shall have the right to establish reservations and restrictions in
favor of its national aircraft in connection with the carriage of persons and goods
for hire between two points on its territory." Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173.
In the United States, the Air Commerce Act of 1926 permitted foreign-registered aircraft to be navigated in the United States where reciprocity in favor of
American aircraft was provided. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254,
44 Stat. 568, 572. Yet, section 6(c) of the 1926 Act also states that "no foreign
aircraft shall engage in interstate or intrastate air commerce." Id. There has been
little substantive change in the federal government's air carrier cabotage policy.
The current version provides that "aircraft permitted to navigate in the United

States ...

may ...

engage in air commerce within the United States except that

they shall not take on at any point within the United States, persons, property, or
mail carried for compensation or hire and destined for another point within the
United States .... " 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b) (1982); see also 298 Aviation Daily
419 (Dec. 5, 1989), reporting that bilateral negotiations between the United
States and the United Kingdom have reached an impasse because the United
States proposal failed to address British concerns including cabotage and foreign
ownership of United States carriers.
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cated by the applicability of the non-discrimination provi3
sions of the Chicago Convention."
None of the alternatives directly address the issue of
foreign entity "control" of United States air carriers.
Although the general governmental interpretative position under the theory of PageAvjet 1H4 was liberalizing, the
more recent InteraArctic "1 5 decision and the administrative
activities in the KLM-Northwest case indicate a return to a
more restrictive application of the "control" theory. A return to the statutory language addressing the control issue in the recently "sunsetted" 1958 Act" 6 may not be
called for, but a definitive United States government policy statement explaining the boundaries of permissible
foreign "control" involvement in United States aviation
would be helpful." 7 Continuing to address this issue on a
case by case basis may only compound the uncertainty
and confusion in the aviation and financial communities.
With respect to the citizenship requirement for aircraft
registration purposes only, the following alternatives are
suggested.
CURRENT LAW

Section 501(b) of the 1958 Act currently provides:
Citizenship for registration purposes only
An aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if(1)
(A) it is - (i) owned by a citizen of the United States or
by an individual citizen of a foreign country who has law" See 296 Aviation Daily 599 (June 26, 1989). For example, legal experts have

questioned whether the European community's plan to create a unified air travel
market among member states (i.e., grant domestic traffic rights to member state
air carriers) is in conflict with provisions of the Chicago Convention banning the
exchange of exclusive cabotage authority. Id.
"4

See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
49 U.S.C. app. § 155 1(a)(7) (Supp. V 1987); see also supra note 49.
" See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 380.25a (1989) (defining "control" with respect to charters operated by direct air carrier affiliates as "any ownership, common management, debtor-creditor, or other relationship between the two entities by which
one entity could influence the other's business decisions other than by armslength business transactions.")
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fully been admitted for permanent residence in the United
States; or (ii) owned by a corporation (other than a corporation which is a citizen of the United States) lawfully organized and doing business under the laws of the United
States or any state thereof so long as such aircraft is based
and primarily used in the United States; and (B) it is not
registered under the laws of any foreign country; or (2) it
is an aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State, territory, or possession of the United States or the District of
Columbia or a political subdivision thereof.
For purposes of this subsection, the Secretary of Transportation shall, by regulation, define the term "based and
primarily used in the United States.""1 8
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES

Alternative 1
Leave the definition in section 101(16) unchanged but
amend section 501(b) by deleting the last paragraph and
substituting in lieu thereof the following: "For purposes of
this subsection, the Secretary of Transportation shall, by
regulation, define the terms 'based in and primarily used
in the United States' and 'citizen of the United States.'
Alternative 2
Leave the definition in section 101(16) unchanged but
amend section 501(b) by deleting it and substituting in
lieu thereof
"section 501(b) United States Registration shall be available without regard to citizenship subject to the following
conditions: (1) that non-citizen registration validly submit
the registrant to United States jurisdiction in all matters
concerning United States-registered aircraft, and (2) that
all United States maintenance, operation, safety and airworthiness standards be fully complied with for all United
States-registered aircraft, without regard to the location of
such aircraft's use."
""

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 501(b), 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(b) (1982).
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In addressing the alternatives relating to the definition
of citizenship for registration purposes only, the first alternative permits a regulatory definition of citizen solely
for registration purposes, thus providing flexibility. The
second alternative adopts a proposal of the New York City
Bar Association." 9 Both alternatives suggest a continuation of the trend towards relaxation in aircraft registration
requirements. What must be resolved is whether the
United States wishes to continue its more restrictive
stance against foreign control of United States carriers,
while at the same time continuing a more liberal stance in
terms of permissibility of aircraft registration. Specifically, the issue is whether the desire to promote the sale
of United States manufactured aircraft continues to justify
a more liberal "citizenship standard" approach for aircraft
registration.
In light of the increasing use of leased aircraft and the
pending action to amend the Chicago Convention to permit the delegation of responsibility for certain safety matters from the state of registry to the state of operator, 120 it
seems appropriate to suggest this additional amendment
to the FAA Act:
Registration of Leased Aircraft
Amend section 501(b)(1)(A) by adding (iii) "leased for a
period of not less than five years to a citizen of the United
States, an individual citizen of a foreign country who has
lawfully been admitted for permanent residence in the
United States or a corporation other than a corporation
1'1See generally Stewart, Lease, Charterand Interchange of Aircraft: A Government Perspective, 14 AKRON L. REV. 187, 199-203 (1980); Howie & Van Dam, Facilitatingthe
Lease and Interchange of Civil Aircraft, ICAO BULL., Feb. 1989, at 9-10. Article 83 bis

to the Chicago Convention, unanimously adopted by the ICAO Assembly in 1980,
establishes a system whereby countries may enter into bilateral arrangements
transferring certain safety responsibilities. Although cast in discretionary terms
(i.e., a state of registry may or may not agree to transfer and a state may or may
not agree to accept some or all of the obligations under a proposed transfer of
regulation), the amendment has received only 50 of the necessary 98 votes for
ratification.
See New York City Bar Ass'n, supra note 108.
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which is a citizen of the United States lawfully organized
and doing business under the laws of the United States or
any state thereof so long as such aircraft is based and primarily used in the United States."
With the emerging prevalence of aircraft leasing, it is
suggested that the 1958 Act be amended to permit the
registration of foreign-owned aircraft in circumstances
where leases are for five years or more to persons who
qualify as citizens of the United States. This proposed
amendment contains a provision for lease registration by
non-United States citizen corporations where the aircraft
is based in and primarily used in the United States, and
deletes the troublesome language relating to partnerships. A different formulation of legislative change would
be to amend the existing provisions of the law relating to
the registration requirements. This amendment would
grant the Secretary of Transportation exemption authority to authorize the registration of foreign-owned aircraft
leased to a United States citizen when the citizen's principal place of business is in the United States. This would
be in keeping with the proposed "83 bis" amendment to
the Chicago Convention. A number of governments already permit such registration.' 12
While I have suggested amending the statutory language, I believe that this issue may be more effectively
dealt with by regulation. This could be accomplished by
providing a regulatory definition of the term "owner."
Although not presently defined by statute, the FAA published one interpretative policy addressing the definition
of "owner" and authorizing the registration of aircraft
under finance leases. 2 2 A similar policy statement or reg121 See generally, AIRCRAFT FINANCE: REGISTRATION, SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT

(R. Hames and G. McBain eds. 1988). With the development and growth of financial leasing arrangements, several governments now permit the registration of foreign-owned aircraft by exemption or otherwise. Among this group are Denmark,
France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and West Germany.
"--See Legal Opinion as to Whether the Lessee of an Aircraft Conveyed Under a
Finance Lease is the Owner of the Aircraft for Purposes of United States Aircraft
Registration, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,877 (Mar. 26, 1981). Aircraft conveyed under fi-
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ulation incorporating the appropriate indicia of ownership requirements in United States citizens could be used
to permit the registration of aircraft leased to United
States citizens. Regulatory action would permit the United
States to gain experience with registering leased aircraft.
Also, it may be easier to change or revoke a regulatory
requirement found undesirable, than to alter a statutory
one.
CONCLUSIONS

The requirement of United States citizenship has
proven to be a thorny briar patch in advising the financial
community, both in the United States and abroad. It is
clear from early legislative history of United States aviation law that a concern for insuring United States security
motivated the United States citizenship requirements. It
is also clear that as the air transportation industry in the
United States grew, the citizenship requirement was
linked to protecting the United States air carrier industry.
With the emergence of deregulation and the need for aircraft to meet the increasing number of air carrier operations, a clear dichotomy developed between the
application of the citizenship standards for air carrier purposes and those for aircraft registration purposes. The
nance leases, may be registered by the lessee as "owner" when such lease is intended as a security transfer. The FAA listed the following criteria as indicia of a
lease intended for security:
(1) All the risks and burdens of ownership (e.g. insurance, maintenance, taxes, fees) are transferred to the lessee;
(2) The lessee has an unrestricted right to sublease the aircraft;
(3) A full payout of the lease is required, which is equivalent to the
purchase price of the aircraft plus interest;
(4) The term of the lease, with or without options to renew the lease
for a nominal sum, is of a duration equal to the useful life of the
equipment;
(5) The options to renew are nominal when compared to the lease
payments during the base lease term;
(6) The aircraft may be sold at the end of the base lease term, at the
option of the lessee and the lessee is entitled to substantially all (i.e.
90%-100o) of the proceeds of the sale.
Id. at 18,877-78.
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questions that remain to be resolved are whether or not
that dichotomy continues to be valid, particularly in light
of the international environment, and what form of legislation, if any, would be useful in addressing the United
States citizenship issue. While we can continue to navigate the misty moor and maintain the rampart, the time
has arrived to reevaluate the entire issue of the degree to
which, in the interest of the United States, foreign ownership in the United States aviation environment is to be
permitted. In evaluating this issue, our government policy and decision makers should guard against being
blindly chained to a tyranny of bureaucratic precedent
that may have validly served the public interest in its time,
but which, in today's aviation atmosphere, may not do so.

Comments

